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Since the end of Cold War, international legal discussion and practice has been 
increasingly permeated by what this article calls “humanity discourse”. The 
article analyzes the discourse from a critical perspective. The main argument of 
the article is that the humanity discourse contributes to what Anne Orford has 
called the “battle for the state”, and consequently to the neoliberal project 
which is now a hegemonic power in global law and policy. This argument is 
supported both by an analysis of humanity discourse in academic discussions 
and an analysis of how humanity language has been used in practice.  
 
I. Introduction 
1. Since the end of Cold War, there has been an increasing focus on the human 
in international legal discourse. This focus has manifested itself, to name just a 
few examples, in the final breakthrough of human rights language, the 
emergence of international criminal law, the concepts of human security and 
the responsibility to protect, and new developments within fields such as 
international investment law and humanitarian law. Within academia, these 
developments have been described as the “humanization” of international law,1 
the replacement of sovereignty with humanity as the guiding principle of 
international law, 2  or even as the establishment of a new global law of 
humanity3 or “humanity’s law”.4 Whatever we choose to call this development, 
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however, it seems uncontested that there is an increasing circulation of 
humanity discourse in international law. 
2. This article subjects the increasing circulation of humanity discourse to a 
critical analysis, so as to discover its potential blind spots, biases, and hidden 
pitfalls. In particular, the article raises concerns about the way the discourse 
may be linked to the current hegemony of neoliberalism which, I suggest, is 
inimical to the main tenets of the humanity discourse, namely the protection of 
human rights, the human security of the weak, and the empowerment of the 
oppressed.  
3. The suggestion that the humanity discourse is linked to trade, markets, and 
neoliberalism might sound both counter-intuitive and banal, depending on how 
it is understood. On the one hand, it is true that much of the literature 
advocating for the humanization of international law is written in order to 
counter some of the destructive effects of global capitalism. Authors such as 
Rafael Domingo and Eyal Benvenisti have argued that a humanity-oriented 
rethinking of international law and statehood is required precisely to fight such 
contemporary phenomena as global capitalism. 5  Looked at from this 
perspective, then, the humanity discourse seems to be almost entirely at odds 
with the neoliberal project.  
4. On the other hand, linking humanity to neoliberalism, trade, and markets 
might seem banal, considering, for example, the endless debate on “trade and 
human rights”. In an excellent coverage of the discussion, Andrew Lang has 
shown how human rights and trade regimes have been entangled together since 
the birth of the regimes in the aftermath of the Second World War.6 Lang 
writes against the common narrative according to which the regimes have 
stood in isolation and “have only recently been forced to confront one another, 
as a result of changes in the organization of the global economy, as well as the 
expansion of each regime’s mandate and ambition”. By contrast, he 
demonstrates convincingly that the regimes were born as mutually compatible 
parts of a system of embedded liberalism, and that there has “always been a 
range of deeply held and well-developed ideas about how international trade 
relates to the protection and promotion of human rights, and that the nature of 
this relationship has been a terrain of struggle and political contest for some 
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time”.7 
5. According to Lang, there have been three key stages in the relations between 
the trade and human rights regimes. As already stated, in the first stage the two 
regimes were linked through the underlying idea of embedded liberalism. If the 
two seemed distinct, it was mostly because no interaction was needed between 
the two, as they served the same overall project in different fields. The system 
of embedded liberalism was challenged, then, in the second stage of Lang’s 
description, by the development ideas of the 1960s and 1970s, which drew 
attention to the way the developed North was exploiting the developing South. 
During this period, a new understanding of human rights put development and 
economic and social rights at the center of the human rights discourse, and the 
links between under-development and trade were unearthed within economic 
discourse. Consequently, human rights language was increasingly used to 
challenge the liberal aspects of international trade. Crucially, however, there 
was no struggle between the two regimes per se; rather, political struggles 
between the North and the South were fought within both regimes 
simultaneously. In the third stage, in the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism 
emerged as the dominant position within trade discourse, linking free markets, 
free trade, and economic globalization into a single, mutually reinforcing 
economic project. Neoliberalism also penetrated the human rights regime, 
which split roughly into two camps: between those for whom economic 
liberalization, enabled by strong property rights and other negative rights, 
increases prosperity and general well-being; and those who used human rights 
to oppose economic reforms.8 
6. Engaging thoroughly with all these different positions is beyond the scope of 
a single article. The angle I wish to take here is narrower but, I believe, also 
quite unrepresented in the aforementioned discussions. The contribution I aim 
to make is to shed light on how the increasingly popular humanity discourse 
(partly encompassing the more specific human rights discourse) in international 
law is involved in shaping and disciplining the state, and how it is therefore 
constantly in danger of contributing to the neoliberal project. In making this 
argument, I draw inspiration from Anne Orford’s recent work regarding a 
“battle for the state” within and through international law.9  
7. The notion of “battle for the state” and its connection to neoliberalism is 
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introduced in Section II. The following two Sections then seek to prove the 
main argument of the article, namely that humanity discourse contributes to 
this “battle for the state”, and consequently to the neoliberal project. Section 
III focuses on humanity discourse in academic theoretical discussion, whereas 
Section IV concentrates on how humanity language has been used in the 
practice of global governance. Whilst many of these practical uses of humanity 
language differ quite drastically from the intentions of the participants in the 
more theoretical humanity discourse, the theory and practice seem nevertheless 
to be more or less in line when it comes to their approach to the state. Sections 
III and IV seek also to shed light on how the disciplining of the state might 
contribute to the neoliberal project. Section V focuses on the implications of 
the observations made in the previous Sections. More precisely, it puts forward 
three interlinked reasons why we should be cautious when our writing and 
actions may contribute to the battle for the state. Section VI concludes.  
II. International law, neoliberalism and the state 
8. As mentioned above, Anne Orford has recently argued that, since its birth in 
the nineteenth century,10 at the heart of international law has been what she 
calls “battle for the state”; that is to say, the struggle over what the state should 
be like, who or what the state should represent, and who will decide.11 This 
battle for the state has been fought perhaps most prominently with regard to 
free trade. Working closely with political economists and other proponents of 
free trade, international lawyers have always been deeply engaged in the 
discussion about the proper limits of the state and the reconstruction of the 
state through economic integration.  
9. In this battle, the liberal project of transforming states into liberal ones, and 
thus instituting and maintaining free markets, both domestically and 
internationally, has always been dominant. More recently, however, the 
hegemony of (neo)liberalism has become even more total as:  
the process of securing the foundations of a liberal market economy 
through international law using the language of rational choice and 
efficiency ‘has become a joint enterprise,’ carried out ‘by economists, 
international lawyers, and rational-choice political scientists’ with a 
particular focus upon informing doctrinal scholarship and institutional 
design through diagnosing ‘substantive problems’ and proposing legal 
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solutions.12  
10. A particularly significant moment in this development has been the 
establishment of the WTO. As Orford writes, in the WTO era the neoliberal 
way of thinking has become so embedded within the doctrines and practice of 
international law that the battle for the state has become almost invisible, as the 
hegemony of the language of non-discrimination and the removal of barriers to 
trade has hidden “the relation of trade law to remaking the state”. With lawyers 
and politicians using this language routinely in the everyday practice of trade 
law and economic governance, its political significance becomes unremarkable, 
“as if it were no big thing that more and more political decision-making is 
moved outside the capacity of organised democratic processes.”13 
11. If neoliberalism has emerged victorious in the battle for the state, then, it is 
worth saying a few words on its vision of the economy, the state, and the 
international order, as well as on its relationship with international law. 
Neoliberalism is a politico-economic theory which argues that human well-
being can be best advanced through entrepreneurial freedoms in an 
institutional setting focused on the facilitation of private property rights, free 
trade, and free markets. In contrast to classical liberalism, for which the 
economic sphere is autonomous and spontaneous, neoliberals understand that 
markets have to be constituted and maintained through interventions. The state 
therefore plays an important role in neoliberalism, for it is the task of the state 
to create and preserve the market and the surrounding institutional framework. 
The state must set up the structures and functions which are necessary for the 
smooth functioning of markets. At the same time, however, neoliberalism is 
very suspicious of the state, in particular democracy and mass politics. 14 As 
Ntina Tzouvala has demonstrated – focusing especially on the German post-
Second World War version of neoliberalism, sometimes referred to as “ordo-
liberalism” – the neoliberal state has to be a very particular type of state. It 
must be strong yet limited, using its strength to resist organized interests and 
guarantee property rights and the uninhibited operation of markets in all 
possible ways.15  
12. When applied to international law, in the writings of ordo-liberal authors 
such as Röpke, this kind of thought entails the creation of stable states with 
limited national sovereignty and a limited range of powers, the abolition of 
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what is seen as “excess sovereignty”, and the enhancement of the judiciary at 
the expense of other branches of government. Furthermore, for the stability of 
the international order, it is important to extend this model of the state to all 
corners of the globe. In this way, the argument goes, the abolition of 
government planning does not lead to anarchy, but is replaced by the order of 
markets and courts.16 These ideas have also been shared since their beginnings 
by the better-known Austrian/Anglo-American strand of neoliberalism, the 
leading figure of which, Friedrich Hayek, envisioned, too, an international 
order guided through economic integration. For Hayek, state planning means 
deliberate discrimination and a threat to rule of law. State planning has 
therefore to be combated, in particular through economic integration. 
According to Hayek, the removal of barriers to free movement of goods and 
capital prevents state planning and “solidarity of interests”, and consequently 
also stops states from developing monetary policy or regulating commercial 
activity in any way seen as harmful to the neoliberal perspective. Since planning 
requires common ideas and values, international integration makes such 
planning much more difficult as decisions will be made through agreements 
with other societies and cultures.17  
13. The work of Orford and others on the battle for the state, trade, and 
investment reveals three important points. First, it opens a new perspective on 
the history and present of international law as an attempt to discipline and 
reshape states. Second, it reveals the hegemony of neoliberal rationale in this 
battle, sometimes concealed behind the routines and language of international 
law. In other words, it suggests the possibility, or rather danger, that practices 
which may seem to have nothing to do with neoliberalism or global capitalism 
might nevertheless contribute to these projects if they help in the process of 
disciplining the state and relativizing its sovereignty – even if they would do so 
for purposes very different to market ones. Finally, it hints that the battle for 
the state is not fought only for the creation of a certain type of international 
order or to regulate relations between states. Rather, it is fought just as much in 
order to target markets, institutions, and populations within states.18 As Orford 
argues, against the commonly held view, international law is not only about 
relations between states. Just as often, it is “about enabling particular kinds of 
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administration by one group of people over another, about entrenching 
particular state forms and not others, about securing particular vital systems of 
resource exploitation, and about constituting property relations.” In so doing, 
international law is equally interested in internal and external aspects of 
government. Hence, the state is very much at the center of international law, 
not always as an actor, but often rather as the target of measures aimed at 
rooting “particular forms of the state.”19 
III. Humanity discourse in theory 
14. The main argument of this article is that the humanity discourse is one of 
the practices and discourses which, in producing knowledge of international 
law, contributes to the battle for the state and – almost certainly against the 
aims and hopes of most of its proponents – supports the neoliberal project. In 
what follows, I seek to prove this claim. The present section focuses on how 
the state is regarded in theoretical humanity discourse. The next section then 
focuses on how the language of humanity has been used in practice, often with 
quite different intentions than when used in theoretical discussion. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that both uses contribute to the battle for the state. 
Furthermore, the study of the use of the humanity language in practice shows 
how many of these uses have been intertwined with neoliberal policies.  
15. Whilst the humanity discourse takes many forms, it is held together by a 
few key theoretical ideas. The first of these is obviously the emphasis put on 
the human. As the argument goes, the human person should be the primary 
subject of international law; not only a beneficiary, or even a subject, as she is 
now. As one proponent of law of humanity declares, “[t]he global order rests 
on the human being, specifically on the unique dignity of the individual and 
collective human person, the true spring of liberty and equality among all 
human beings.”20 Similarly, considerations of humanity should not only play an 
important part in the interpretation of international law; humanity should be 
the leitmotif of and primary source of legitimacy in international law. 21 The 
second key element in the humanity discourse is the conviction that there are 
certain universal human rights and needs which should be protected always and 
everywhere – through humanitarian interventions and transformative 
occupations, many would argue, if need be. It is, however, the third and final 
theme of the discourse which is most interesting here.22 This theme – which is 
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a kind of by-product of the other two – is a certain suspicion of the state. 
Reasons for the suspicion vary. Some point to the fact that states have 
traditionally been the main violators of human rights. Others worry that states 
are becoming incapable of effectively protecting the human rights of their 
citizens in the condition of increasing globalization.23 Others still take a more 
theoretical stance, and argue that our fixation on the state hinders the progress 
of international law and its development towards a global law of humanity.24 
16. Often connected with the suspicion of the state is the managerial mindset, 
according to which the most fundamental issues touching human life are now 
increasingly global “and therefore ought to be managed by global networks of 
knowledge and expertise and outside the anachronistic structures of sovereign 
statehood.” 25 Conversely, state sovereignty tends to be seen in this mindset 
predominantly “through its dark side – as a functionally inept and morally 
corrupt form of absolutism that is used only by domestic elites in order to hide 
from well-founded international criticism.” 26  Against sovereignty, then, this 
mindset seems to prefer the authority of technical experts who aim to “manage 
global problems so as to attain optimally effective solutions.” 27  As Martti 
Koskenniemi explains, the guiding principle seems to be that sovereignty 
“should not stand in the way of producing ‘democracy’ or ‘rule of law’ or 
‘human rights’ or ‘security’”.28 Consequently, authority is seen to derive from 
the outcomes of rule: power should be in the hands of those who can de facto 
protect human life and human rights most efficiently – in contrast to those to 
whom it may have been given through formal procedures.29  
17. This mindset is indeed reflected in writings of many participants to the 
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humanity discourse. According to Anne Peters, for example, state sovereignty 
has to be relativized in the sense that it is conditional on effective protection of 
human rights and human life.30 Similarly, according to Jeremy Waldron, states 
should not be bearers of autonomous value, for they exist only for the sake of 
human beings, whose well-being is the end of international law.31 Accordingly, 
the state should not be considered so much a subject of international law as an 
“official” of it.32 For Eyal Benvenisti, states should be perceived as “trustees of 
humanity”. Benvenisti notes that we are increasingly confronted with issues 
which go beyond the jurisdiction of any single sovereign. In a world of 
increased interdependency and interconnections, the concept of sovereignty 
should therefore be adapted to the realities of our world in the sense that states 
should, as trustees of humanity, be bound to take certain other-regarding 
considerations of humanity into account, even if they are not bound by specific 
treaties or custom. 33  Finally, Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have 
recently introduced the idea of sovereigns as “fiduciaries of humanity”. As 
Criddle and Fox-Decent write, “the time has come to retire the traditional, but 
increasingly embattled, conception of state sovereignty as exclusive 
jurisdiction”. State sovereignty is therefore not a prerogative of the state but 
emanates from “a fiduciary relationship between states and the people subject 
to their jurisdiction”. In practice, this means that a state’s sovereignty and 
autonomy “is derived from, and wholly dependent upon”, the fulfillment of its 
fiduciary duties.34  
18. Whilst the aforementioned authors are unlikely to think in such terms, it is 
difficult not to see some affinity between their writing and the rationalities 
which Michel Foucault described as “biopolitics”, referring to different 
technologies and rationales aimed at the maximization of life.35 It is important 
to mention Foucault here because of the connection his work makes between 
the rationale of protecting life and the very same economic rationale discussed 
in the previous section of this article. Indeed, in his lecture series titled Birth of 
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Biopolitics, 36  Foucault barely mentions the word ‘biopolitics’ at all, focusing 
almost entirely on analyzing liberalism and neoliberalism. Biopolitics and 
(neo)liberalism are, then, clearly linked in Foucault’s thinking. A bridge 
between the two is provided by another one of Foucault’s key concepts, namely 
“governmentality”. With that concept, Foucault tried to capture an ensemble of 
“institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, and tactics” which allow the 
exercise of a complex form of power which has “population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security 
as its essential technical instrument.”37  
19. Governmentality is therefore very much the product of (neo)liberal and 
biopolitical rationales, and a way of realizing both. Indeed, as Anne Orford 
summarizes the connection between free trade, control of populations, and 
security: 
While debates about free trade and investment often have an abstract and 
rationally persuasive quality to them, the schemes they propose are 
dependent upon controlling people and territory. The question of what to 
do with ‘surplus’, ‘redundant’, or displaced populations is a question that 
has haunted attempts to constitute a market-oriented agricultural order since 
the nineteenth century.38 
20. Furthermore, the notion of governmentality is important here because it 
does not perceive states as somehow natural self-evident entities, but rather as 
ensembles of myriad, sometimes contradictory, rationales and techniques of 
how to govern. In other words, it tends to lead to similar consequences as 
described in the previous section in the context of neoliberalism: states are 
transformed from sovereign actors in pursuit of commonly agreed projects to 
ensembles of ways of governing, fulfilling managerial aims as efficiently as 
possible, without democratic support if need be. 
21. At this point it should be emphasized, however, that I do not want to argue 
that the participants in the humanity discourse – or the free trade advocates, for 
that matter – would aim to get rid of the state altogether. Even the author who 
is perhaps most critical towards the state within the discourse, namely Rafael 
Domingo, still sees a role for the state, even if it would be reduced to one 
institution among many in his “new global law”.39 Indeed, the aim of both the 
humanity and the free trade perspective seems rather to be to reduce the role of 
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the state and “unbundle” its sovereignty,40 exposing it to (usually competing) 
global rationales which it should start executing in its domestic policies. I 
therefore want to steer away from drawing any sort of analogy between world 
politics and the sort of biopolitics which goes on within advanced liberal states, 
and especially from the idea that the world would be governed by any single 
logic of rule. But what I do want to emphasize is that different global rationales 
require the state for their execution and realization. States are what make any 
sort of implementation of global rationales even remotely possible – but only if 
they are removed of any sort of “excess sovereignty” which would allow 
domestic collective planning to oppose those rationales.  
22. Thus whilst the discourses of humanity and free trade have somewhat 
different foci, they seem to be connected in their attempt to reshape the state. 
Many participants in the humanity discourse seem to believe that global 
problems dealing with humans across the world would be best managed by 
international institutions and expert bodies, rather than states, whereas free 
trade advocates dread any sort of state interventions on markets. Furthermore, 
the two discourses are connected theoretically in Foucault’s work through his 
notion of governmentality which utilizes the economic rationale in order to 
secure and maximize the life of the population.  
23. So far the analysis of the humanity discourse has remained very theoretical. 
As such it is open to the Marxian and realist critiques of Foucauldian 
approaches, according to which the latter tends to lose touch with the actual 
power dynamics of world politics and international law. In order to escape this 
critique, then, and to provide some depth and nuance to my argument, I will 
next analyze how humanity language has been used in practice – often in ways 
not anticipated by participants in the discourse – and how these uses relate to 
the free trade project.  
IV. Humanity discourse in practice 
24. It is not only within academic quarters that humanity discourse circulates. 
Instead, humanity language has been transformed into practice through several 
international operations and within different regimes, often in ways which likely 
differ quite dramatically from the intentions of the theorists discussed above. 
My argument in this section is that when the humanity language has been used 
in practice in this way from the 1990s onwards, it has tended to target states 
more than individuals or peoples. Or, perhaps more accurately, it has been used 
to discipline states, perhaps in the process of seeking to improve the lives of 
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individuals. Furthermore, some of the operations harnessing the humanity 
language have been entangled with neoliberal policies. Methodologically, my 
intention in this section is to “go wide” in order to paint a larger picture. This 
means that I cannot provide detailed “case studies”; rather, my contribution is 
to draw together and combine the results of more detailed studies done by 
others.  
25. The final breakthrough of human rights gave a huge boost to the 
dissemination of the humanity discourse in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
discourse had perhaps its largest impact during the UN’s territorial 
administration missions. Relying heavily on humanity rhetoric, the UN took 
effective control of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Eastern Slavonia in 1996, and 
Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. While international territorial administration 
is an old and established practice, 41  some commentators have seen these 
missions as the beginning of a radically new version of it, dubbed 
“humanitarian occupation”.42 Unlike in previous cases, such as the trusteeship 
system, the welfare of the population and the protection of human rights and 
human life are now, according to Fox, “genuinely” the primary concern of the 
occupiers. Furthermore, according to Stahn, the missions fed the rethinking of 
sovereignty and challenged the state-centered vision of territorial authority and 
governance, supporting the claim that international law is increasingly about 
organizing individual and people’s rights.43 
26. The outcomes of the humanitarian occupation missions were massive.44 As 
Stahn writes, “international actors took it on themselves to organize societies in 
a manner that purports to promote the functioning of domestic institutions and 
the realization of the rights of individuals.” Human rights were used to justify 
large-scale reforms to state institutions, even completely rebuilding the state if 
necessary.45 In the words of Fox, humanitarian occupation missions are best 
seen as social engineering projects aimed to reform governmental institutions 
for the benefit of the life of the administered population in a context where 
protection of humanity has become “a question for the broader international 
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community.”46 Wilde has made a particularly interesting point in this regard, 
writing that international territorial administration projects have not in fact so 
much responded to the consequences of a conflict, as commonly assumed, but 
rather patched vacuums created by the missions themselves. In other words, 
rather than operating reactively to bridge existing gaps, UN authorized 
administrators have operated actively, displacing local actors in order to create 
different policy changes.47  
27. In particular, international actors sought to transform the administered 
territories into distinctly (neo)liberal states.48 As Korhonen, Gras, and Creutz 
write 
One of the inherent characteristics in post-conflict governance from the 
1990s onwards has been the normative agenda of liberalism pursued by 
international administrations […] It includes e.g. the holding of multi-party 
elections, constitutionalism, the rule of law, the human and minority rights, 
good governance, and economic liberalization.49  
This “liberal peacebuilding package” was, Korhonen, Gras, and Creutz 
continue, pursued in all post-conflict situations as if it were neutral and 
universally accepted 50 – the peacebuilders never stopped to ask whether the 
package fit the target country, but the success of all the projects was measured 
simply in terms of certain liberal yardsticks, such as the holding of elections 
and the establishing of key institutions.51  
28. Fox paints a similar picture. In Bosnia, for example, wide implementation 
responsibilities were assigned to the UN, UNHCR, ICRC, NATO, OSCE, and 
the World Bank. The ECHR was made to apply directly and have propriety 
over all other law. Civilian authority was put in the hands of the “international 
community”, represented through the Office of the High Representative, which 
was granted jurisdiction “over virtually every aspect of economic 
reconstruction, human rights and institutional rehabilitation”, as well as the 
authority to interpret the Dayton documents. 52  Similarly, in Kosovo all 
legislative and executive powers were vested in the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). Civilian administration was to be controlled by the UN, 
humanitarian affairs by the UNHCR, institution building by the OSCE and 
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reconstruction by the EU. Moreover, the Security Council ordered UNMIK to 
establish institutions for multi-ethnic government, the application of 
international human rights instruments, democratic governance, and a market-
based economy,53 and the interim administration has indeed made full use these 
powers.54  
29. In East Timor, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) was established to take overall responsibility for the administration 
of East Timor and to exercise all legislative and executive authority, leading 
quickly into controversies with the local population which found UNTAET to 
be very unreceptive to any of their wishes and complained repeatedly of 
autocratic rule – most importantly when UNTAET entered into a treaty with 
the World Bank on a local governance project on behalf of East Timor. The 
World Bank took control of the economic governance of the country, aiming to 
transform the society’s “culture of subsistence and informal economy” into 
“one that develops capitalism, creates opportunity and ultimately formalizes the 
economy.”55 Furthermore, the World Bank reformed East Timor’s agriculture 
radically, guided by the Bank’s long-established vision that agriculture should 
be a commercial activity included into global value chains – even with the 
possible detriment to local food security and food sovereignty – leading to 
disastrous effects following the global food crisis of 2008.56   
30. The world has changed quite radically since the beginning of the 
humanitarian occupation missions and it is therefore very unlikely that we will 
witness more such missions, at least in the near future. A kind of swan song of 
the practice was the occupation of Iraq in 2003. Unlike the humanitarian 
occupation missions, it did not gain the acceptance of the international 
community, conducted instead by the United States and its allies unilaterally. 
Nevertheless, much like the humanitarian occupation missions, the occupation 
of Iraq, too, was justified with humanity rhetoric. There was hardly a single 
press release during the Iraq mission which did not refer to the human rights of 
the Iraqi people, but the more legal link between human rights and social 
transformation was spelled out perhaps most clearly in the testimony of former 
U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Council John 
Yoo to a Senate hearing regarding human rights, constitutionalism, and the rule 
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of law in Iraq.57 In his testimony Yoo fiercely defended an expansive reading of 
the law of occupation, arguing that a broad discretion to reform the occupied 
state is necessary to ensure the protection of human rights and democracy.58 
Hence, “it almost certainly will be necessary for the United States to change 
Iraqi law to dismantle current Iraqi government institutions and create new 
ones to take their place.”59 
31. The measures taken by the occupiers were extensive indeed. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), established to administer Iraq for the duration of 
the occupation, asserted at the outset that the goals of the interim 
administration were to introduce wide-ranging reforms in Iraq. All CPA 
regulations and orders spelled out the legal basis for the legislation and 
routinely invoked the well-being of the Iraqi people.60 Iraq’s Penal Code was 
amended several times in the name of international human rights law. 61  A 
Central Criminal Court was established in the name of the Iraqi population and 
a Special Tribunal in the name of public order and international rule of law.62 A 
Human Rights Ministry was set up and the minimum age of work changed in 
order to protect health, safety, and morals of children.63 Vast economic reforms 
included changes to trade law, company law, securities law, bankruptcy law, 
intellectual property law, and copyright law, as well as the introduction of flat 
tax rates. The result was perhaps the world’s most investor friendly legislation, 
as well as a drastic shrinking of the public sector. Moreover, Ntina Tzouvala 
has demonstrated how Iraq’s farming was reconfigured along neoliberal, 
corporate lines and absorbed into global food chains with massive impacts for 
the local population. 64  The CAP justified these changes by stating that it 
worked closely with the Governing Council and in co-operation with 
international financial institutions in order to fulfil its responsibilities toward 
the Iraqi people, aiming to improve conditions of life.65 All in all, the CPA 
transformed Iraq “from a centralized dictatorship into a market-based 
democracy” by completely re-programming the Iraqi legal, political, and 
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economic system.66  
32. Even if humanitarian occupations or even such unilateral occupations as in 
the case of Iraq are unlikely to repeat in the current political context, where the 
United States has lost its position as an unchallenged superpower, some of the 
elements behind the use of the humanity language in those missions have lived 
on in a different guise. Whilst the responsibility to protect and human security 
discourses have moved away from direct forms of intervention, dominant in 
the 2001 ICISS Report, its focus on liberal state-building has amplified. This is 
reflected, for example, in the 2009 document Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, which concentrates on building the capacity of states to fulfill their 
responsibility to protect. According to the Report, the main threat to human 
security is “the weak institutional capacity of some sovereign states”, rather 
than “the legal barrier of sovereignty itself.” 67  Similarly, when the General 
Assembly finally came to a common understanding on human security in 2012, 
it defined human security as “an approach to assist Member States in 
identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the 
survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.”68 Whilst the actual content of 
the Resolution remained rather vague, 69  the definition clearly highlights the 
importance of the state for human security: human security is to be achieved by 
building states and their capacities, and must be implemented with respect to 
territorial integrity.70  
33. This is reflected also in “post-developmentalism” in the Third World more 
generally. As outlined, for example, in the World Bank’s 2011 World 
Development Report, Conflict, Security and Development, post-developmental 
policies distinguish between stable and fragile states based on their ability to 
respond to different forms of stress. Fragile states are at the center of post-
developmentalism because their vulnerability to different outbreaks threaten 
the ability of economy to “sustain increases in per capita income over the long 
term”, and therefore jeopardize economic growth more generally – not only in 
the Third World, but also globally.71  
34. Yet it might be that we are already moving beyond responsibility to protect 
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as well. Today, the impact of the humanity language is perhaps largest in 
regards to counter-terrorism and the refugee question. In counter-terrorism, 
humanity language has played an important role in changing the position of the 
UN Security Council “from a political executive body established by treaty to 
enforce the peace and provide collective security in a crisis, to the executive 
organ of the international community, enforcing its global constitutional law”.72  
35. The United States and its allies took advantage of the new possibilities of 
the Council in the war on terrorism by using the Council to “legislate”, 73 
producing what some have called “global security law” and extending its cover 
across the world.74 Humanity language was used both to facilitate this process 
and to resist it. Many used the human rights language to draw attention to the 
atrocities committed in the name of counter-terrorism,75 but the United States 
and its allies also learned quickly to use the language for their benefit.  
36. Not only was the war on terror often presented as necessary for the 
protection of the human rights to life and security, 76  but superficial human 
rights rhetoric, as well as the language of “international community”, were also 
quickly woven into the operation of the Counter-terrorism Committee in order 
to assure troubled states and ensure their cooperation. 77  This allowed the 
production of “a concerted, coordinated anti-terrorism campaign that has 
united most countries in the world in a common template of action.”78 States 
were swiftly convinced to develop domestic policies which were remarkably 
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similar, allowing the core, most importantly the United States, to control what 
goes on in “the periphery”, and thus “discipline populations both in the center 
and the periphery while appearing to shape only the latter.”79 As Kim Lane 
Scheppele comments, “the new global security law operates primarily by 
permitting strong states to shape the content of the internal legal systems of 
weak states, which facilitates the peripheral regimes doing the jobs they have 
been delegated.”80  
37. The refugee protection system, again, has slowly developed from a simple 
treaty regime to a complex network of humanitarian governance. With 
humanitarian governance I mean, following Michael Barnett, “the increasingly 
organized and internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, 
and reduce the suffering of the world's most vulnerable populations.” 81 
Refugee protection is now at the heart of this attempt, the refugee crisis lying 
“at the intersection of multiple regimes," and being governed through different 
fields of law, including but not limited to refugee law, human rights law, and 
international humanitarian law.82  
38. As Agier writes, the humanitarian governance of refugees is “a globalized 
apparatus: a set of organizations, networks, agents, and financial means 
distributed across different countries and crisscrossing the world”.83 It protects 
life, but also enables the smooth functioning of global life by regulating 
movements of displaced populations and clearing up the “confusion” caused 
by individuals ending up beyond their national borders. As Francois Debrix 
notes, the “UNHCR gathers individual subjects, redistributes them, and finally 
provides them with a new internationally recognizable identity”.84 The dark side 
of this process is, according to some critics, that the rigorous selection process 
of refugees in the Global North is enabled by camps in the South.85 In a way, 
the refugee system provides one solution to the old question of what to do 
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with the world’s “surplus population”.86 Humanitarian governance normalizes 
the refugees in the sense that they are no longer “free-flowing, wandering, or 
nomadic individuals”, but are “reorganized and reinserted within the 
international community as yet another type of calculated distribution.”87 
39. To answer the question of what has been done with the humanity language 
within the aforementioned regimes, then, my argument is that the measures 
taken have had more to do with disciplining states than reaching individuals 
and peoples directly. All of these actions are said to have been conducted for 
the benefit of humanity or some more specific groups of humans, yet the 
results in this respect have been somewhat mixed. There is no doubt that at 
least some of the operations and practices have brought great humanitarian 
relief. Nevertheless, the new focus on the human seems to mean primarily “the 
prevention of cruelty and the preservation of bare human life against 
persecution and atrocities perpetrated by either governments or social groups.88 
It is therefore mostly about what Didier Fassin has called “biolegitimacy”, that 
is to say, the recognition of life – understood in the sense of simply being alive 
– as the most fundamental of all values.89 This kind of protection of life is 
certainly a crucially important goal; yet it should be pointed out that it does not 
necessarily lead to the empowerment of human beings. Moreover, when 
applied in practice it tends to require distinctions to be made between lives to 
be saved, lives to be risked, and lives to be sacrificed.90 This is reflected in a 
compact form in refugee camps in which refugees are in practice “divided into 
several distinct subcategories of ‘vulnerability’”, and to “good” and “bad” 
refugees.91  
40. Where the outcomes have been more consistent and more in line with 
humanity rhetoric, however, is with regard to states. In all of the examples 
mentioned above, humanity rhetoric has been used to limit and re-
conceptualize state sovereignty or change domestic legislation and institutions. 
Whilst the humanitarian occupation missions are an extreme example and are 
unlikely to repeat in the near future, and it might be that we are moving beyond 
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responsibility to protect as well, the attempt to discipline the state is visible also 
in post-developmentalism.92 Furthermore, the counter-terrorism campaign has 
been very efficient in convincing states into adopting almost uniform, rather 
deep-reaching legislation in the protection of human security. Outside the 
regimes mentioned above, several measures in international criminal law have 
attempted to “disrupt the relationship between the individual and the State and 
relegate the latter from its status as the primary actor in the international 
system”,93 thus increasing the power of international tribunals which are seen as 
“the engine of an expanding global rule of law”.94 From this perspective, then, 
state action starts to seem “more like a dilution of an international tribunal than 
a necessary and beneficial complement to it". 95 Within international human 
rights law, a very notable recent development is the increasing use and 
relevance of indicators and periodic reviews.  Indicators – which, importantly, 
depend on political decisions on what qualifies as worth measuring and what is 
left outside – shape national governmental decision-making, as it is important 
for many states to perform well in light of the indicators in order to boost their 
reputation and have access to resources. 96  Similarly, the Universal Periodic 
Review – treating states as isolated entities, removed from any historical, 
political, or economic context and their relations with other states and non-state 
actors, and measuring their performance according to certain “universal” 
standards 97  – tends to push “at the boundary of non-interference” in its 
recommendations by fellow states and in its pressure to adopt certain practices, 
institutional structures, and standards.98 
41. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the humanity project has not 
been used against the state per se. That is to say, it has not challenged the 
existence and territorial integrity of states. Indeed, while the rhetoric of 
humanity has been used to shape and perhaps even hollow the state, at the 
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same time the shell of the state has been maintained meticulously. In other 
words, while the practices described above may have challenged state 
sovereignty as traditionally understood, as well as the right to self-
determination, they seem at the same time to support the continued existence 
of states, and an international order built around states. This was reflected even 
in the extreme example of humanitarian occupation missions. According to 
Fox, the fact that the Security Council took the exceptional measures of 
humanitarian occupation “suggests a deep commitment to preserving existing 
states, but equally to a model of the state as embodied in the human rights and 
territorial integrity norms”. In all cases of humanitarian occupation, existing 
borders were preserved and populations maintained intact and in particular 
places – sometimes even with the help of coercive measures.99 According to 
Wilde, then, international territorial administration bolsters “the norm that the 
global political space should be divided into Westphalian states”.100  
42. Furthermore, whilst some have argued that humanitarian governance of 
refugees entails the emergence of de-territorialized politics, the practice of 
refugee protection seems to lead in the completely opposite direction, the 
regime effectively maintaining an international order of states where “the 
human population is segmented, ordered, and governed”. Hence, even though 
refugee protection is a global regime, governed by a fluid network built mostly 
by nongovernmental actors, it by no means challenges the importance of the 
state in global law and politics, nor does it bring about the demise of the state. 
Rather, it redistributes authority from states to the international community, 
whilst at the same time highlighting the centrality of the order of states. 101 
Similarly, while human rights have allowed deep-reaching interventions into 
core areas of states, the human rights system is based completely on the 
relation between states and their citizens. As Patrick Macklem writes, the role 
of human rights law is to monitor and control the exercise of state sovereignty, 
but at the same time relies on a system built around states. Human rights are 
therefore not so much a product of moral insight as a counterbalance to “the 
adverse effects of how we organize global politics into an international legal 
order.” 102  Even the counter-terrorism campaign used states, acting through 
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them by swiftly producing a global anti-terrorism network.103  
43. To sum up, this section has argued that when humanity language has been 
put into practice, its most direct results have had perhaps less to do with 
individuals and peoples than with disciplining the state. Whilst none of the 
practices challenge the existence and territorial integrity of states, and seem to 
uphold the notion of an international community built around states, they have 
nevertheless used humanity language to intervene within domestic matters, 
shape states into a certain liberal form, and/or limit their sovereignty and 
possibilities to engage in collective domestic projects and state-planning. In this 
sense, the practice seems to differ from the way humanity language is used in 
theory when it comes to the human, but aligns with it in regards to the state, 
which is treated as a fiduciary, trustee, or official of humanity by many authors. 
This section has also given a few examples of how humanity discourse and 
neoliberal policies have been connected in practice. Most of the humanitarian 
occupation missions involved the complete neoliberalization of the political 
institutions and economic system of the target states, and in Iraq human rights 
language was used to justify an even more radical transformation of the society 
into a neoliberal market-based one. Furthermore, human rights and neoliberal 
policies are enmeshed also in the World Bank’s lending practices and 
developmental policies. 
V. Implications: in defense of the state 
44. The argument put forward in the previous two sections has been that whilst 
there are great differences between the theoretical human rights discourse and 
the way the humanity rhetoric is used practice, what they have in common is an 
attempt to discipline the state. In this way, I have argued, the participants in the 
humanity discourse have contributed – perhaps unwillingly – in the “battle for 
the state” that Anne Orford has shown to characterize international law for a 
long time, in particular in relation to free trade. This section focuses on the 
implications of that argument. In other words, it seeks to show why we – the 
participants in the humanity discourse – should be wary about this 
development.  
45. For me, there are three reasons for finding the connection between the 
humanity discourse and the battle for the state worrisome. The first relates to 
the function of state sovereignty. For many participants in the humanity 
discourse, state sovereignty seems to signify an excuse for states to mistreat 
their population without consequences, or some kind of remnant of 
nationalism. These dangers should be taken seriously, to be sure. Nevertheless, 
this tendency to view state sovereignty predominantly through its dark side has 
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the problem of neglecting the other side of the coin; the bright side of state 
sovereignty. This bright side has been described by Martti Koskenniemi as 
enabling “collective life as a project”.104 In contrast to many participants in the 
humanity discourse, Koskenniemi distinguishes his defense of state sovereignty 
from any kind of nationalism or idea of natural, organic communities. Indeed, 
what is to be defended is precisely the “wonderful artificiality of the state”.105 
46. The state provides “a set of institutions or practices in which the forms of 
collective life are constantly imagined, debated, criticized and reformed, over 
and again.” The project that Koskenniemi envisions is therefore not one of 
essence but – by contrast – of becoming. In fact, it is the governance and 
managerialism preferred by many participants in the humanity discourse which 
tend to rely on “essences” in assuming that human beings are “born ready-
made, with stable and unchanging preferences, always acting with a view to 
maximizing utility”. 106  Moreover, the dispute relating to state sovereignty 
should not be imagined as one “about who is nationalist’ or who 
‘internationalist’.” Instead, it is about different versions of “what domestic 
democracy and international governance ought to be”, and about carving space 
for such discussion in the first place.107  
47. The second reason for caution is in a way the flipside of the first one. If the 
first point was that many participants in the humanity discourse tend to view 
state sovereignty only through its dark side – as enabling abuse – it could also 
be argued that they tend to view the increased power of international 
institutions only through their bright side, forgetting that they, too, can be tools 
of power and enable abuse. In other words, the humanity discourse 
underestimates the extent to which globalization has reshaped sovereignty, and 
in particular the extent to which sovereignty can be an attribute of the global 
order. As Hardt and Negri have argued, previous dichotomies between rulers 
and ruled, core and periphery have become blurred, or deterritorialized and 
reterritorialized, in today’s world.108 In particular, sovereignty has disseminated 
to the global level and within states. Instead of clear dichotomies, we have today 
new types of hierarchies, “constituted and sustained by more complex patterns 
and logics, which are obscured, and hence reinforced, where globalization is 
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elided with neo-imperialism.” 109  Furthermore – both building on and contra 
Hardt and Negri – power does not have to be in the hands of those with 
authority. Thus those who are sovereign in the sense that they can exercise 
authority do not necessarily have to be those who actually wield power behind 
that veil of authority. Rather, different institutions and networks can serve to 
veil and legitimize the exercise of power of those actors who get to act through 
them, as was witnessed in the United States acting through the Security Council 
and the CTC with regard to the war on terrorism.  
48. The third reason for caution is closely interwoven with the first two, in 
particular with the loss of national defense mechanisms and collective planning, 
as well as with the new forms of power created in the process of globalization. 
Together these processes, and the drawing of the state into global markets, 
culture, and governance, has limited the policy options of the state. What 
makes this development so worrisome – and this is my third point – is the 
current hegemony of the neoliberal economic rationale. As the economic 
rationale has become increasingly disembedded from society and turned global, 
for example in the form of international trade rules, societies are increasingly 
viewed as the economy. Consequently, different principles of social 
organization are separated from each other and ranked accordingly, producing 
regimes which privilege economic efficiency. This tends to force states to shape 
themselves into a uniform model with little regard to their particular 
socioeconomic, political, and historical idiosyncrasies. As Audrey R. Chapman 
writes, in regards to health policy and the human right to health:  
In a globalized system many states, particularly poor ones, have significant 
constraints on both their ability and their freedom to implement human 
rights obligations, or, to describe the situation in another way, global market 
integration is shrinking the ability of all governments to make decisions 
about health without taking into consideration such factors as economic 
competitiveness, credit worthiness, debt payments to external creditors, and 
complying with trade agreement conditions, even when these are contrary to 
human rights paradigm and impose health negative effects.110  
Indeed, as Paul O’Connel has argued, this process of “neoliberal globalization” 
is inimical to the fundamental aims of the humanity discourse – the protection 
of the human rights and human security of the oppressed, and the 
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empowerment of the weak. 111  Whilst neoliberalism relies strongly on some 
classic, negative rights, most importantly the right to property, it tends to be 
hostile towards positive rights, reducing its capacity to fulfil its human rights 
obligations.112   
49. However, I also wish to add a few caveats to the arguments made in this 
section. First, separating out the three points above is, of course, quite artificial 
in the sense that they are tightly interwoven and feed one another. The less the 
state can engage in collective planning, the more it is exposed to global 
rationales. And the stronger the pressures of globalization and neoliberalization 
become, the narrower the leeway of the state becomes. Similarly, globalization 
and neoliberalism are connected in the sense that globalization disseminates the 
neoliberal rationale around the world, whereas the neoliberal attitude facilitates 
globalization by creating free global markets and unifying state policies. Second 
– and most importantly – I do not want to suggest that neoliberal policies are 
only forced on states from outside. By contrast, the shift occurs also from 
within and below,113 not least because it tends to grant great benefits for state 
elites and others who are in the position to take advantage of privatization and 
international investment. Third, and finally, I want to emphasize that I do not 
want to view globalization exclusively as a negative phenomenon, nor am I 
against international institutions or the notion that state sovereignty has to be 
sometimes pierced for the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, I hope 
that I have managed to prove that there is reason for caution and careful 
thinking when our writing and actions might contribute to the battle for the 
state which is currently so dominated by neoliberal ideas. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
50. Whilst it has recently suffered some backlashes in the form of the rise of 
populism, xenophobia, and nationalism around the world, humanity discourse 
has nevertheless risen to a prominent position in international law in the past 
couple of decades. It is therefore important to subject it to critical scrutiny, in 
order to understand its potential, but also its blind spots. This article has aimed 
to contribute to that critique. Since such a task is too great for one journal 
article, this one has focused only on one aspect of the humanity discourse, 
namely its relation to the state. 
                                                        
111 Paul O’Connell, On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-Liberal Globalisation and 
Human Rights, 7 Human Rights Law Review (2007). 
112 ibid., 501. 
113  See Sahib Singh, The Fundamental Rights of States in Neoliberal Times, 4 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015). 
26   Chinese JIL (2015)  
51. The key argument of the article has been that the increased humanity 
discourse contributes to what Anne Orford has called the “battle for the state”, 
and has in so doing ended up reinforcing the hegemonic neoliberal project in 
world politics – most likely contrary to the aims of many participants in the 
humanity discourse. This argument has been backed up by an analysis of both 
the academic, theoretical humanity discourse, and the use of its key ideas in 
practice. The theoretical discussion is linked to the battle for the state especially 
by its suspicion of the state and its managerial mindset, which bears some 
resemblance to the rationale which Foucault described as biopolitical 
governmentality. These abstract theoretical musings were confirmed through 
analysis of humanity language in practice. Whilst the way humanity language 
has been transformed into practice – and in particular the outcomes this 
transformation has produced – differs in many ways from the aims of many 
academic participants in humanity discourse, it seems to support its main tenets 
regarding the state. Although the practice seems to have bolstered the existence 
and territorial integrity of the state, and reaffirmed its continued importance for 
world politics and global law, it has contributed to the unbundling of state 
sovereignty and the limiting of state power, and has disciplined states into 
adopting a certain very specific liberal form.  
52. Moreover, the analysis of the theory and practice of humanity discourse 
highlighted some connections between the discourse and neoliberalism. 
Theoretically, these links are no doubt often unintentional and are provided 
especially by the notion of governmentality, which links maximization of the 
life of the population to the economic rationale. But in practice this connection 
is much clearer in the way humanity language has been used to justify massive 
economic transformations, for example as part of humanitarian occupation 
missions, the occupation of Iraq, and food security measures.  
53. I have suggested that the link between humanity discourse and the 
neoliberally-dominated battle for the state is very troublesome. It removes the 
possibility of collective, political projects of becoming, as well as possibilities 
for resistance, and as such not only contributes to “the effort to isolate markets 
from local political contestation”,114 but also limits the states’ options to fulfil 
their (positive) human rights obligations and ensure the well-being of their 
populations. Furthermore, it serves to hide the exercise of power behind the 
veil of international institutions and fluid global networks and as such 
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safeguards hierarchy both globally and within states. 115 Thus, whilst there is 
much to applaud in the increased circulation of the humanity discourse, both in 
academia and in practice, we should remain cautious of its potential effects 
when it becomes entangled with hegemonic global rationales.  
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